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Biomass is increasingly being considered as a feedstock to provide a clean and renewable source of
energy in the form of both liquid fuels and electric power. In the United States, the biofuels and
biopower industries are regulated by different policies and have different drivers, which impact the
maximum price the industries are willing to pay for biomass. This article describes a dynamic computer
simulation model that analyzes future behavior of bioenergy feedstock markets given policy and
technical options. The model simulates the long-term dynamics of these markets by treating advanced
biomass feedstocks as a commodity and projecting the total demand of each industry, as well as the
market price over time. The model is used for an analysis of the United States bioenergy feedstock
market that projects supply, demand, and market price given three independent buyers: domestic
biopower, domestic biofuels, and foreign exports. With base-case assumptions, the biofuels industry is
able to dominate the market and meet the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) targets for advanced
biofuels. Further analyses suggest that United States bioenergy studies should include estimates of
export demand in their projections, and that GHG-limiting policy would partially shield both industries
from export dominance.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
The use of biomass as a feedstock for energy production is one
option to provide a clean, renewable, and domestic source of
energy. Although biomass is a renewable resource, the amountEnergy; EERE, DOE Ofﬁce of
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l.gov (E.M. Searcy).
-NC-ND license. that can be grown sustainably and accessed economically is
limited (US Department of Energy (DOE), 2011a). In the United
States (US), growth in the use of biomass feedstocks for energy
production is increasingly being driven by governmental policies
such as Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) for biofuels production
and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) for biopower production
(Sorda et al., 2010; US Department of Energy (DOE), 2010).
However, the future size and strength of the bioenergy industry
in the US is uncertain in the face of high values for biomass
overseas that may drive up domestic prices for processed bioe-
nergy feedstocks. Additionally, the potential for greenhouse gas
(GHG)-limiting legislation creates uncertainty for investors in
bioenergy and could disproportionately change the value of
biomass for biopower compared to biofuel. The US Department
of Energy (DOE) is investigating the utility of a commoditized
uniform format for bioenergy feedstocks, which would expand
access to many biomass industries and biomass resources, help
minimize market volatility, and reduce risk to both bioreﬁneries
Nomenclature
Units of measure
$ US dollars
Bgal Billion US gallon
gal US gallon
GGE Gallons of gasoline equivalent
Gl Gigalitre, 1E9 litre
GW Gigawatts of electric power
l Litre, 0.001 m3
MW h Megawatt hour of electrical energy
Mton Million US short ton
Mt Million metric tonne
t Metric tonne
ton US short ton
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While the uniform format removes some risk and limits to growth
of bioenergy, it may enhance direct competition for bioenergy
feedstocks among biopower, biofuels, and exporters. Therefore,
as government and industry focus on the use of biomass as a
commoditized feedstock for clean and renewable energy produc-
tion, a need arises for techno-economic analysis regarding the
effect of policies and strategies on the sustainability of multiple
bioenergy industry sectors.
This study analyzes the emerging bioenergy industry by
investigating patterns in the behavior of bioenergy feedstock
markets given a range of technical and policy options. The article
begins with a review of bioenergy technologies and policies that
are creating a commodity market for bioenergy feedstocks. The
core of the article presents the Bioenergy Market Model, which
simulates the primary causes of growth in bioenergy feedstock
markets and furthermore presents simulated scenarios that
describe the effect of technologies and policies on three bioenergy
industries: biopower, biofuels, and exports. This model also
presents a graphical method of analyzing the dynamic allocation
of commodities to multiple buyers given a revenue-maximizing
supplier and allowing for supply or demand-limiting conditions.
This is a new approach to dynamic market allocation that
attempts to quantify instantaneous demand vs. price curves for
potential buyers. Scenarios are presented that show a wide range
of behaviors for the bioenergy feedstock market based on
assumptions about the implementation of current bioenergy
policy, the strength of export markets, the bioenergy technologies
used, and the effects of greenhouse gas (GHG)-limiting legislation.2. Technology description
2.1. Biofuels technology
To be economically viable, biofuels will need to be cost-
competitive (after tax and subsidy) with conventional fossil fuel
based transportation fuels such as gasoline. Although DOE’s Ofﬁce
of Biomass Program is working with industry to develop, build,
and operate integrated bioreﬁneries at various scales (e.g., pilot,
demonstration, and commercial), it is assumed in the mean time
as these integrated bioreﬁneries are designed and tested that
conventional bioreﬁneries can ﬁll the gap. For the purpose of this
study, we assume the economics of reﬁnery production only
hinge on liquid fuel cost targets that are based on competitiveness
with conventional transportation fuels. From discussion, a nom-
inal value of the cost target for biofuel at the output of the
bioreﬁnery is 0.79 $ l1 (3 $ gal1).
There are a variety of options for converting biomass into
biofuels, generally divided into biochemical (biological-based)
and thermochemical (heat-based) conversion processes. Although
there are speciﬁc technologies within each of these general
categories, biochemical conversion technologies, such as enzy-
matic hydrolysis, desire feedstocks with a high carbohydratecontent and will be wet at the time of conversion (for example,
Aden, 2008). Thermochemical conversion processes, such as
gasiﬁcation and pyrolysis, generally require a dry feedstock that
is low in ash content and has a small, consistent particle size (for
example, Phillips et al., 2007; Dutta et al., 2011). Because of these
generalizations, herbaceous feedstocks that are naturally higher
in ash and carbohydrates are generally allotted to biochemical
conversion, while woody feedstocks with their lower ash content
are directed to thermochemical conversion. Although yields for
various conversion technologies vary greatly, we applied yields
and costs from recent DOE design reports on biofuels production
(Kabir Kazi et al., 2010; Dutta et al., 2011; Phillips et al., 2007) to
simplify a model representing multiple disparate conversion
processes down to conversion efﬁciency (l t1), which is the
amount of biofuel produced per ton of biomass used, and
conversion cost ($ l1), which is assumed to be a ﬁxed cost over
the annual timeframes considered herein.
2.2. Biopower technology
Biomass combustion to generate electricity has existed in the
United States since the inception of the power grid. Historically,
woody biomass, such as residues from timber harvesting,
sawmilling, and pulp and paper, has been a feedstock to co-located,
direct-ﬁred boilers for electricity generation and/or heat. Agricul-
tural residue, primarily from wheat and corn harvests, has also
contributed to biopower production. These practices have grown
the biopower industry into the third highest generator of renew-
able electricity in the nation next to hydropower and wind power,
providing 12% of US renewable generation capacity in 2010 (Energy
Information Administration (EIA), 2011a). Biopower is increasingly
being targeted as an option to reduce GHG emissions from the
electrical power industry. However, the existing paradigm of small,
co-located plants is not economically scalable to reach large emis-
sion cuts. The biopower industry is therefore exploring the option of
co-ﬁring energy-dense biomass in existing coal plants at mixtures of
up to 20% biomass to decrease emissions, meet renewable energy
targets, and continue to support energy security (US Department of
Energy (DOE), 2010). To be economically viable, this option must be
cost-competitive with standard coal plants, and must also compete
against other renewable technologies that may replace coal in the
future.
This study considers co-ﬁring biomass with coal as a domestic
option for reducing GHG emissions from the electric power
industry. Multiple technologies exist for modifying existing coal
plants to co-ﬁre biomass. Conventional woody feedstocks, such as
debarked, chipped pine are readily available at many locations
but may require signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to the plant, including
the potential for de-rating its output capacity. However, if the
biomass is dried and energy density increased via a process such
as torrefaction, a potentially low-cost heating method that
reduces the biomass to near-zero moisture content and increases
energy density, it behaves much more like coal and minimal
modiﬁcations are necessary to existing coal plants assuming the
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avoids the need to de-rate co-fed coal plants because its heat
content is similar to that of coal (Tumuluru et al., 2010). Because
coal plants are located throughout the US and have varying access
to biomass, it is likely that a range of these technologies will be
employed. For the purpose of this study, the performance
of the biopower industry is concentrated into two variables. The
ﬁrst is the average biomass to electricity conversion efﬁciency
(MW h t1) of all biopower plants, which is the amount of
electricity produced by only the biomass portion per tonne of
biomass used. This number will be higher if more plants choose to
co-ﬁre torreﬁed versus conventional feedstocks. The second
technology variable is the added cost of retroﬁtting and operating
a coal plant with biomass co-feed ($ MW h1). This cost is higher
if more plants use conventional feedstocks.
2.3. Commoditized biomass
A major barrier to large-scale bioenergy development in the
US is the continued availability of quality, economical biomass.
The current practice for both the biopower and biofuels industry
is to site plants near the biomass resource, such that the
bioreﬁnery is completely dependent on a single feedstock
resource. This approach imposes many limitations on bioreﬁnery
planning, while increasing the risk of plant shut-downs due to
supply chain disruptions, such as insufﬁcient biomass yield (due
to pests, drought, ﬂood, etc.) and contract disputes with biomass
suppliers (Hess et al., 2009). A bioreﬁnery that does not have a
sustainable feedstock supply is itself unsustainable. These plants
are often designed around the properties of one or a few feed-
stocks and are entirely dependent on the local supply chain for
availability and pricing. Because localized yields and character-
istics of the biomass, such as moisture, ash, and carbohydrate
content, can be highly variable, costs to produce large-scale fuel
or power under this system will also be variable. Large-scale
biopower and biofuels development will not be able to tolerate
this wide-spread volatility.
A proposed solution to bioenergy feedstock quality and price
volatility is to diminish the location dependency by creating a
uniform feedstock supply chain that draws from a range of raw
biomass types (Hess et al., 2009; Searcy and Hess, 2010). This
system will create a bioenergy feedstock with standardized
characteristics that may be easily transported, stored, and
handled in existing high-capacity infrastructure. Although the
beneﬁts of a uniform-format system are extensive (Hess et al.,
2009; Searcy and Hess, 2010), the most relevant to this study is
the ability to buy and sell biomass on a commodity market. This
advanced uniform feedstock design provides more market options
for producers because farmers do not need to be contractually
obligated to one buyer, and multiple industries, such as biopower
and biofuels, will be able to bid for the same feedstock. This
system creates bioenergy feedstocks that are tradable commod-
ities, with all the classic economic beneﬁts that commodities
provide. For these reasons, this article concentrates on the
behavior of a commoditized market for bioenergy feedstocks that
are being accessed by multiple industries.3. US bioenergy policy
3.1. Biofuel policy
As outlined in the US Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA) of 2007, the DOE aims to increase renewable biofuel
production from the current level of 42 Gl (10.5 Bgal) to 136 Gl
(36 Bgal) by 2022. To reach this goal, the EISA expanded theNational RFS Program, which sets targets for biofuel production
that increase annually from 2012 through 2022. The RFS also
gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) statutory obli-
gation to set a penalty which is assessed to producers who miss
their annual production targets. The new RFS decomposes biofuel
targets into categories to ensure that they are met in a sustainable
and equitable manner. The deﬁnition of ethanol-speciﬁc cate-
gories along with their respective RFS volume targets are illu-
strated in Fig. 1. Targets for overall renewable biofuel follow a
linearly increasing pattern, while targets for advanced and cellu-
losic biofuels follow an exponentially increasing pattern. It is
assumed that conventional corn-based renewable biofuels will ﬁll
the gap between the total renewable biofuel requirement and the
advanced/cellulosic components, with the overall fraction con-
tributed by corn-based biofuel decreasing through time. This
study concentrates on the subset of the biofuels industry that
DOE terms advanced because these are the most likely to use
commoditized bioenergy feedstocks and also the most likely to
experience direct competition with other bioenergy industries.
The types of biofuels eligible for consideration as advanced may
include several conversion technologies: Ethanol derived from cellulose, or lignin
 Ethanol derived from sugar or starch (other than corn starch)
 Ethanol derived from waste material
 Biomass-based diesel
 Biogas
 Butanol or other alcohols produced through the conversion of
organic matter from renewable biomass
 Other fuel derived from cellulosic biomass (EISA, 2007).
Renewable Identiﬁcation Numbers (RINs) are the policy-driven
mechanism for ensuring that prescribed targets under the RFS are
met. A RIN is a 38-character code that is issued at the point of
biofuel production or import, and reported to the EPA at that
time. One RIN is attached to each gallon of biofuel produced,
transferring ownership along with that biofuel until it is blended
or reﬁned into a motor vehicle fuel. At that point, the RIN may be
used for RFS compliance, held for a maximum of 2 years for future
compliance, or traded into a RIN market. Companies that sell
motor vehicle fuels are obligated to submit to the EPA a quantity
of RINs proportional to their total fuel production for RFS
compliance, either through blending with RIN-producing fuels
or by buying them from the RIN market. There are ﬁve separate
RIN categories separated by technology: cellulosic biofuel,
advanced non-cellulosic biofuel, standard biodiesel, cellulosic
biodiesel, and other renewable fuel (US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), 2010). All of these RINs, except for the
‘‘other renewable fuel’’ category, may be turned in to meet the
advanced RFS volume obligation, as long as sub-mandates are
met. Therefore, we concentrate on the average value of RINs that
count towards the advanced biofuel targets.
The price of a RIN in some respects provides insight into the
impact of RFS mandates on bioenergy feedstock markets. Essen-
tially, high RIN prices reﬂect a strong impact of mandates on the
market, while low RIN prices mean that market expansion may
not be driven by mandates alone (McPhail et al., 2011). The RIN
market practically ensures compliance with RFS targets because
the RIN price theoretically bridges the gap between the transpor-
tation industry’s willingness to pay for biofuel and the fuel
industry’s willingness to produce it. In the case that a company
cannot produce RINs for its obligation, the EPA may allow that
company’s deﬁcit to roll over until the following year or set a
penalty price that would effectively cap RIN prices. Ultimately,
the details of RIN policy will determine whether the market
is effective. As Ford et al. (2007) showed for similar energy
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Cellulosic Biofuel 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.9 3.8 6.6 11.4 16.1 20.8 26.5 32.2 39.7 51.1 60.6
Advanced Biofuel 2.3 3.6 5.1 7.6 10.4 14.2 20.8 27.4 34.1 41.6 49.2 56.8 68.1 79.5
Total Renewable Biofuel 42.0 49.0 52.8 57.5 62.6 68.7 77.6 84.2 90.8 98.4 106.0 113.6 124.9 136.3
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Renewable Biofuel: “fuel produced from renewable biomass… used to replace or reduce the
quantity of fossil fuel present in a transportation fuel.”
Advanced Biofuel: “renewable fuel other than ethanol derived from corn starch for which
lifecycle GHG emissions are at least 50% less than the gasoline or diesel fuel it replaces.”
Cellulosic Biofuel: “renewable fuel derived from any cellulose, hemicellulose, or lignin, each
of which must originate from renewable biomass.” (EPA, 2010)
RFS categorical production targets versus time
Fig. 1. United States RFS targets for biofuel production. This study concentrates on the advanced category.
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delays often cause these types of markets to hit their price cap
early and oscillate around a fundamental price over time, even
without perturbations in supply or demand. In this article, the RIN
price is assumed to work stably as designed to ensure RFS
compliance. An effective cap on RIN values is included that lowers
uncertainty and limits industry burden. We track the fundamen-
tal RIN value to biofuel producers, and do not address the
speculative components and market inefﬁciencies that may also
increase RIN prices.
3.2. Biopower policy
The DOE biopower workshop held in December 2010 cited
the lack of a federal RPS and the lack of comprehensive carbon
legislation as two of the largest policy-related hindrances to
biopower development in the US (US Department of Energy
(DOE), 2010). Because no federal RPS presently exists, policy-
induced incentive for biopower development is currently driven
by state RPS legislation. Currently, there are 24 states and the
District of Columbia with RPS policies in place, accounting
for over half of U.S. electricity sales. Five states – North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Vermont – have set voluntary
goals instead of RPS that have binding targets. RPS targets and
timeframes differ in each state. Their cumulative contribution
to national renewable electricity targets as a percentage of the
national electrical demand is illustrated in Fig. 2 (US Department
of Energy (DOE), 2012a; Energy Information Administration (EIA),2011b). If the distribution of demand among these states remains
relatively proportional through time (e.g., a state that represents
4% of national demand now will represent 4% in 2020), the
current sum of mandatory RPS calls for approximately 11% of
national electricity to be generated by renewable sources in 2030,
which equates to 56.5 GW of average renewable generation if
national electricity demand grows at a rate of 1% per year.
Because it is uncommon for state RPS policy to include signiﬁcant
technology-speciﬁc targets similar to the RFS, biopower must
compete against other renewable electricity technologies to
satisfy these targets.
In response to state RPS requirements, multiple markets have
arisen for the trade of Renewable Energy Certiﬁcates (RECs).
Similar to RINs, RECs are awarded and priced for every 1 MW h
generated by a renewable energy source. For compliance markets
(e.g., markets in which the RPS targets are mandatory) the REC
must be generated within the same geographical boundary as the
market. Voluntary markets have also arisen, in which RECs may
be generated anywhere in the nation. Currently, compliance REC
prices vary between 2 and 40 $ MW h1 depending on the market
(US Department of Energy (DOE), 2012b). This high discrepancy is
a result of a wide range of policy details, as well as the highly
variable cost to develop renewable energy in different geogra-
phies. With similar assumptions to this article, Ford et al. (2007)
calculated that a national REC price required to induce a switch
from coal to a mix of natural gas and renewable sources is 15
$ MW h1. This is assumed to be the incentive needed to spur
investment in the development of new projects that are relatively
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Fig. 3. Causal loop diagram of a bioenergy feedstock market, with the dampening feedback loop in bold.
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R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263 253capital-intensive as compared to the biomass co-feed technology
that is assumed here. This suggests that a 15 $ MW h1 REC price
is a fundamental mode that the market may settle on to induce
investment in renewable energy projects such as wind and solar.
If biopower is not competitive at this fundamental REC price, it is
unlikely to develop at a large scale since other technologies will
meet the RPS targets. Therefore, the fundamental 15 $ MW h1
REC price is assumed to be steady and unaffected by biopower
development in this analysis, and biopower is assumed to be able
to satisfy up to 50% of RPS-induced demand without signiﬁcantly
affecting the fundamental REC price.4. Model development
The Bioenergy Market Model simulates policy-relevant inter-
annual dynamics of a biomass commodity market for bioenergy
development. Focusing on biomass feedstocks as a commodity,
it projects the supply, demand, and market price for the aggregateadvanced bioenergy feedstocks over time. The model currently
focuses on three industry sectors that compete for biomass:
biofuels, biopower, and foreign exports. By dynamically expand-
ing the supply capacity of the bioenergy feedstock based on
perceived demand, the simulated commodity seller sets its price
and allocates its product among the industries according to their
demand versus price relationships. The Bioenergy Market Model
is used to test both policy and technology scenarios that drive
competition between the three industry sectors, with a concen-
tration on leverage points that can create desirable outcomes.
4.1. Theory
The essential source of dynamic behavior in the Bioenergy
Market Model is the balancing feedback loop that tends to slow
the growth in the bioenergy industry over time. Referencing
Fig. 3, this feedback loop illustrates that the group of suppliers
target feedstock supply capacity to meet the perceived demand at
the suppliers’ absolute minimum selling price, which is primarily
R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263254dependent on supply chain costs. The instantaneously perceived
demand reﬂects a seller that is targeting marginal demand to
maximize proﬁt, in other words targeting a market where
marginal utility of trading additional biomass is just above zero.
Because demand is highly price dependent, and the minimum
feedstock price is a function of supply capacity via variable
grower payments, the realized demand is dynamically dependent
on supply capacity. Assumptions about how each of these vari-
ables responds causally to its contributing factors determine
the strength of the loop, and the resistance to industry growth.
The primary assumption is that the structure of this loop reﬂects
the behavior of a bioenergy feedstock market.
The causal loop diagram in Fig. 3 was developed with insights
from economic equilibrium theory, which states that commodity
markets tend to seek a price at which supply meets demand, and
this phenomenon balances perturbations of supply or demand that
clears the market over time (Varian, 1992). In the dynamic case,
supply and demand need not necessarily be equal at any one point
in time, but the commodity price is targeting this condition
(Mantel, 1974; Debreu, 1974). In the Bioenergy Market Model, the
bioenergy industries are consumers, each with a dynamically
calculated demand versus price relationship. The suppliers are
biomass processors that follow bioenergy feedstock technology
roadmaps to develop a biomass commodity. To maximize proﬁt,
the suppliers attempt to match total feedstock capacity to the total
perceived demand at their minimum price for the bioenergy feed-
stock. The minimum price is that at which the suppliers’ marginal
proﬁt shrinks to zero, which is assumed to be equal to the suppliers’
cost of producing the bioenergy feedstock in this analysis.
To determine the partitioning of the bioenergy feedstock among
industry sectors, the model draws frommultinomial logit theory of
discrete choice. Economists use the multinomial logit function
when the utility of multiple discrete choices depends on a single
set of variables, and alternative choices are not correlated with
each other (Menard, 2002). In the case of bioenergy feedstocks, the
choice is how much biomass a particular industry will buy at a
market price given alternatives for that industry’s goals. The
multinomial logit function returns the probability of choosing each
alternative given its utility versus those of the remaining alter-
natives. As the number of decisions becomes very large, this
probability is equal to the proportion of total decisions made in
the alternative’s favor. In the case of economic commodity parti-
tioning, each alternative is assumed to have a distribution of
marginal demand versus commodity price that may overlap with
those of other alternatives. The Bioenergy Market Model extends
this assumption by developing normally distributed marginal
demand curves, as is shown in Fig. 4. Each distribution’s mean is
the average economic value of the bioenergy feedstock to that
industry. The standard deviation of each distribution represents
the assumption that these industries contain multiple non-uniform0
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The supplier’s minimum price is depicted as a vertical line in Fig. 4.
The multinomial logit function would return the proportional area
of each distribution that is shaded by this vertical line. In the
example of Fig. 4, the biofuels industry is satisfying around 65% of
its instantaneous fuel demand potential using biomass, presum-
ably meeting the remainder with an alternative technology or
simply producing fuel at less than maximum capacity. Biopower
and exports have cheaper alternatives to meet their goals, and
therefore do not play in the bioenergy feedstock market in this
example. Because the multinomial logit does not reﬂect situations
that are dynamically supply or demand limited, we developed an
alternative solution to calculate the instantaneous market price.
At every point in time, the Bioenergy Market Model simulates
the market described in Fig. 4 by assuming that the supplier is
attempting to maximize proﬁt, setting the bioenergy feedstock price
accordingly. To maximize proﬁt, the supplier takes the highest bids
from consumers in Fig. 4, approaching the incremental demand
curves from right to left and satisfying this demand until one of
three conditions is met: (1) it reaches the minimum price at which
marginal proﬁt approaches zero; (2) it exhausts supply; or (3) it
meets all quantity demanded. In this way, industries with a higher
value for the commodity will submit higher bids, and will receive a
higher proportion of the commodity partition. This high-to-low
value integration is presented in Fig. 5. Cumulative distributions
on the left are stacked to represent the total instantaneous demand
at a particular feedstock price. The supplier is deﬁned by a minimum
price (vertical line) and a maximum instantaneous supply (horizon-
tal line). The market price is that at which the demand and supplier
curves intersect, or the price at which all quantity demanded is
satisﬁed, whichever is highest. In this way, assumptions of a
competitive commodity market are satisﬁed and a value-based
commodity partitioning is accomplished, including dynamically
supply or demand limited conditions. While similar to classical
economic supply and demand theory, the curves represent the
capacity of the market at any one point in time, and do not include
demand or supply that would be added in the future.4.2. Implementation
The causal loop diagram of Fig. 4, as well as the price setting and
commodity partitioning algorithm described previously, were
implemented using the System Dynamics methodology described
by Sterman (2000) and Ford (2010). System Dynamics is useful for
computer simulation of complex interactions between disparate
variables with explicit implementation of feedback. Using a visual
programming language consisting of accumulators (stocks), ﬂows,
and delay-inclusive feedback, the modeler is able to simulate causal
interactions through time. The Bioenergy Market Model simulatesiofuels
Price, $/ton
iomass Export incremental demand distribution
iofuel incremental demand distribution
The Market moves from right to left 
(integrating the incremental demand) until
one of three conditions are met:
1. It hits the minimum feedstock price
2. It exhausts supply
3. It meets all demand
104 112 120 128 136 144 152 160 168 176 184 192 200
ith three consumers represented by marginal demand curves.
$0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
$10 $20 $30 $40 $50
Grower Payment $ per tonne
Mtonne/yr
Grower Mt demand vs cost
Inverted grower payment curve – 2017
Inverted grower payment curve – 2030
Inverted grower payment curve – 2010
Inverted grower payment curve – 2022
Current Demand
M
illi
on
 d
ry
 to
nn
es
 o
f r
aw
 d
em
an
d
Grower Yield vs. Payment Through Time
$60 $70 $80 $90 $100
Fig. 6. Discrete curves of raw biomass availability versus grower payment for multiple years are shown with lighter weight, while the heavier curve represents the
interpolated grower payment curve during year 2020 of the simulation. The intersection with the grey demand line is the current grower payment, approximately 86 $ t1
in this example.
0
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
M
to
nn
e/
yr Exports
Biopower
Biofuels
The y-axis shows the total demand 
at a particular feedstock price
Feedstock Price, $/tonne
7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 91 98 105112119126133140147154161168175182189196
Suppliers feedstock price and supply
1-tier Stacked Biopower cumulative demand
2-tier Stacked Export cumulative demand
Biofuel cumulative demand
Market clears at intersection of
supply and demand
Horizontal line shows feedstock
supply
Vertical line shows min
feedstock price
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R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263 255the growth of the bioenergy feedstock market over multiple years
with sub-annual resolution. The version described herein simulates
market behavior from 2010 to 2030 and runs quickly for instant
user feedback. Assumptions can be edited by moving slider bars or
clicking graphs. Output charts and tables are continuously updated
as the model runs. The model may run an entire simulation or can
be paused mid-run to allow the user to change settings.
To develop the normal distributions of marginal demand by
industry sector in Fig. 5, the model uses three parameters for each
industry: (1) the mean economic value of the bioenergy feed-
stock; (2) the standard deviation of that value; and (3) the
maximum instantaneous demand. For the export sector, the
driving factors for these parameters are nebulous and are left as
a manual input from the user. For the biofuels and biopower
industries, the standard deviation is manually entered, but the
mean value and the maximum demand are calculated based on
technical and policy drivers. The biofuels industry builds capacity
in proportion to the difference between the marginal cost of
producing biofuels and their cost targets. This dynamic capacity
calculation determines the biofuels industry’s maximum instan-
taneous demand. The mean economic value of the feedstock to
the biofuels industry is calculated using Eq. 1:
V f ¼ ðCþ IRFSþ IðPGHGÞFuelsPÞ  Zf , ð1Þ
where: Vf is the value of feedstock to the biofuels industry [$ t
1];
C the cost target of the biofuels industry [$ l1]; IRFS the totalincentive from RFS policies [$ l1]; I(PGHG)Fuels the biofuel incentive
as function of GHG policy [$ l1]; P the biofuels levelized cost,
excepting fuel costs [$ l1]; Zf the efﬁciency of biofuel conversion
process [l t1].
Eq. (1) is based on the assumption that the biofuels sector is a
collection of cost-driven companies that will attempt to buy RINs
if they cannot meet externally-driven cost targets.
Similar to biofuels, the biopower industry is driven by equations
for demand and mean economic feedstock value. The biopower
industry is assumed to be dominated by existing coal-ﬁred facilities
that may co-feed biomass to acquire RECs and/or GHG credits.
Because most RPS targets do not mandate biopower speciﬁcally, the
maximum demand for bioenergy feedstocks is assumed to be
proportional to but less than the nationally cumulative RPS target.
The fraction of total renewable electricity requirements that
could potentially be ﬁlled by biopower is set by the user. Eq. (2)
calculates the mean economic value of the bioenergy feedstock to
the biopower industry:
Vp ¼ ðZþ IRPSþ IðPGHGÞPowerDLCÞ  Zp, ð2Þ
where: Vp is the value of feedstock to the biopower industry [$ t
1];
Z the price of electricity from coal [$ MW h1]; IRPS the total
incentive from RPS policies [$ MW h1]; I(PGHG)Power the biopower
incentive as function of GHG policy [$ MW h1]; DLC the additional
levelized cost of co-ﬁring biomass [$ MW h1]; Zp the efﬁciency of
biopower conversion process [MW h t1].
R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263256This equation states that coal plants will revert to using a pure
coal feed unless the overall cost, including all incentives, of
generating power with biomass is cheaper. The incentive from
RPS policies is essentially the value of a REC, and the effect of
biopower practices on REC prices is assumed to be minimal.
In concurrence with calculating the marginal demand versus
price distributions, the supplier’s capacity, and the supplier’s
minimum price, the model runs the price setting and feedstock-
partitioning algorithm described in Section 4.1. By integrating
Fig. 4 from high to low feedstock prices, the model creates Fig. 5,
providing the cumulative demand versus price relationship. The
maximum of the price at fully satisﬁed demand, the supplier’s
minimum price, and the price to clear full supply is the instanta-
neous market price for the bioenergy feedstock. This price is used
in a lookup fashion using the cumulative demand versus price
relationship to determine the amount of feedstock material that is
allocated to each sector. By using this model, realistic projections
of bioenergy feedstock market behavior can be examined given
multiple assumptions about policy and technology.
In the Bioenergy Market Model, the ability of the supplier to
acquire and process biomass into a bioenergy feedstock is
represented with a stock that changes in response to dynamically
changing demand at the seller’s minimum price. This stock
represents the total supply of the bioenergy feedstock supplier
and is represented by a horizontal line in Fig. 5. The supplier’s
minimum price, which is the vertical line in Fig. 5, is the sum of
logistics costs and payments to the biomass grower. Logistics are
simulated as a constant cost per ton of processed biomass,
decreasing at a constant improvement rate through time. This
simulates the asymptotic decline in supply chain costs oftenTable 1
Technology and policy parameters, (——) indicates no change from base case.
Model section Parameter
Policy and demographics Fraction of RPS open to biopower
Fundamental REC pricea
Electricity load growth fraction
RIN lower collar price
RIN upper collar price
RIN market response time
Effective CO2 emission price
b
Logistics and preprocessing Logistics farmgate to facility costc
Logistics improvement rate
Supplier expansion time
Biopower Biopower conversion efﬁciencyd,e
Coal electric conversion efﬁciencyf
Biopower stddev feedstock value
Biopower levelized conversion costd,e
Coal levelized conversion costf
Price of coal feedstockg
Biofuels Biofuel conversion efﬁciencyh
Biofuel stddev feedstock value
Biofuel levelized production costh
Biofuel reﬁnery construction time
Biofuel gasoline equivalenti
Exports Mean value of feedstock for exports
Biomass Export stddev feedstock value
a Ford et al. (2007).
b Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2009).
c Hess et al. (2009).
d Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) (2009).
e US Department of Energy (DOE) (2010).
f International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010).
g Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2012).
h US Department of Energy (DOE) (2011b).
i Wu et al. (2006).observed with technology learning curves. Grower payments are
simulated as a function of demand for multiple years as illu-
strated in Fig. 6. The sloping curves in this ﬁgure represent the
total amount of biomass available at a particular grower payment
for multiple discrete years. At the beginning of the simulation, the
marginal cost of acquiring raw biomass is high. This marginal cost
decreases through time as agricultural and silvicultural bypro-
ducts become more readily available, and as more energy-speciﬁc
growth takes place. The model simulates this behavior by inter-
polating discrete grower payment curves through time, moving
from the bottom curve in Fig. 6 to the top curve over the course of
the simulation. The x-axis point where the actual demand inter-
sects the interpolated grower payment curve is the simulated
price of raw biomass.5. Simulation scenarios
In response to communication with bioenergy subject matter
experts, four scenarios were developed that reﬂect important
policy and technical issues facing the industry (Haq, Z., personal
communication, March 2012). The ﬁrst scenario is a base case
that simulates a best estimate of bioenergy feedstock market
behavior under current technology and policy projections. The
second scenario calculates the additional incentive that would be
needed for biopower to meet 50% of RPS targets under the base
case assumptions. The third scenario tests assumptions about the
impact of a high-demand export market. The fourth scenario tests
the growth of this market assuming a price for GHG emissions.Unit Scenarios
Base case GHG cap Export competition
0.5 ————— —————
$ MW h1 15 ————— —————
% yr1 1 ————— —————
$ l1 0 ————— —————
$ l1 0.13 ————— —————
yr 1 ————— —————
$ t1 0 40 —————
$ t1 49.4 ————— —————
%/yr 1 ————— —————
yr 1 ————— —————
MW h t1 2 ————— —————
MW h t1 2.2 ————— —————
$ t1 3.3 ————— —————
$ MW h1 8 ————— —————
$ MW h1 7.5 ————— —————
$ MW h1 20.4 ————— —————
l t1 333 ————— —————
$ t1 3.3 ————— —————
$ l1 0.49 ————— —————
yr 0.5 ————— —————
l l1 1.4 ————— —————
$ t1 66 ————— 154
$ t1 11 ————— —————
R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263 2575.1. Current policy trajectories without export competition
The base case for the Bioenergy Market Model simulates
behavior of the bioenergy market in the United States if current
policies that drive its development stay in place for twenty years
and the US does not become a major feedstock exporter. Principal
to these assumptions are the RFS and RPS targets and their
associated incentives. This scenario assumes that the commodi-
tized bioenergy feedstock represents all operations that the RFS
legislation terms advanced, meaning renewable, non-corn-based
feedstocks that constitute a net 50% GHG emission savings1/1/2010 1/1/2014 1/1/2018 1/1/2022 1/1/2026 1/1/2030
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Fig. 7. Stacked plot of biomass demand for three major consumers.
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Fig. 8. In the base case, market prices are scompared to the fuel it replaces. The advanced RFS targets
depicted in Fig. 1 drive RIN prices in this scenario and the biofuels
industry targets a total value of 0.79 $ l1 (3 $ gal1) for their
produced fuel. The value of advanced RINs starts at 0.026 $ l1
(0.10 $ gal1) and dynamically changes to target compliance with
the RFS up to an effective cap set by the EPA which is assumed to
be 0.13 $ l1 (0.50 $ gal1). Advanced biofuel is produced from a
variety of feedstocks, including torreﬁed and non-torreﬁed woody
and herbaceous materials using a range of technologies that yield
333 l t1 (80 gal ton1) on average at a total levelized production
cost of 0.49 $ l1 (1.85 $ gal1) (US Department of Energy (DOE),
2011b).
For biopower, RPS requirements remain as they stand in spring
2012 and only mandatory RPS states enact binding REC markets.
Biopower is assumed to be able to capture 50% of the new
renewable energy demand without signiﬁcantly affecting the
fundamental REC value. Volatility in REC markets is controlled
to the point that discrete jumps in RPS targets as illustrated in
Fig. 2 may be ignored and a linearly increasing RPS-induced
demand is used. The REC price is proportional to the slope of
the RPS, peaking just above 15 $ MW h1 and using an initial
price ﬂoor of 5 $ MW h1 as suggested by Ford et al. (2007). The
biopower industry targets a total generation cost on par with the
average coal plant, approximately 27.9 $ MW h1 in this scenario
(Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012). Biopower is
assumed to co-ﬁre existing coal plants with a 20% mixture of
torreﬁed and non-torreﬁed materials that produce a national
average production efﬁciency of 2.0 MW h t1 at an increased
levelized production cost of 0.50 $ MW h1, as compared to pure
coal ﬁring (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), 2009;
US Department of Energy (DOE), 2010).M
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Fig. 9. Calculated added incentive for the biopower industry and dynamic RIN
value for the biopower incentives scenario.
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scenario, so it offers on average 66 $ t1 for the processed
feedstock at US ports. The relationship of grower payment to
demand through time is matched to the baseline assumptions in
the DOE Billion Ton Update (US Department of Energy (DOE),
2011a). Logistics of feedstock processing from ﬁeldside to market
are assumed to start at 49.4 $ t1 and improve at a rate of 1% yr1
throughout the simulation period based on results from the Idaho
National Laboratory’s Biomass Logistics Model assuming a
balanced advanced woody and herbaceous supply chain (Hess
et al., 2009). The remaining technology-related parameters are
illustrated in Table 1. With these assumptions, Fig. 7 illustrates
the total bioenergy feedstock that would be necessary to meet all
RFS targets for advanced biofuels, 50% of mandatory RPS targets
using biopower, and an assumed growth in export demand.
Biofuels and biopower alone require over 370 Mt yr1
(410 Mton yr1) of processed biomass to meet targets by 2030,
while total potential demand including exports grows to
690 Mt yr1 (760 Mton yr1).
The results from simulating the base case scenario suggest that
the biofuels industry has an advantage in acquiring advanced
biomass feedstocks given current domestic bioenergy policy and
ignoring exporters. Referring to the results in Fig. 8, the RIN
market incentivizes the biofuels industry to meet RFS targets for
the entire simulation. RIN prices start at 0.026 $ l1 (0.10 $ gal1)
and oscillate around this value until RFS targets plateau in 2022,
at which point the RIN price decreases to 0.009 $ l1 (0.035
$ gal1). Due to the smoothing effect of the RIN market and
bioreﬁnery construction delays, there is a slight overbuild in
biofuels capacity during the RFS target plateau, causing the
biofuels industry to end the simulation with a 0.7 effective annual
capacity factor. The biomass feedstock opens with a 105 $ t1
(95 $ ton1) market price and oscillates then decreases to
102 $ t1 (93 $ ton1). The biopower sector does not acquire
any of the biomass feedstock because no coal plant is willing to
pay over 75 $ t1 (68 $ ton1) for the feedstock. Exports were
purposely excluded from the market by assigning the industry a
port value of 66 $ t1 (60 $ ton1).
5.2. Incentives to meet all domestic targets
This scenario investigates the added incentives that would be
needed for the biofuels and biopower sectors to concurrently
meet the production targets assumed in the base case. In that
scenario, the biofuels sector settled on a 0.026 $ l1 (0.10 $ gal1)
RIN price to meet growing RFS targets and the biopower sector
had a 15 $ MW h1 incentive to meet its portion of RPS targets. In
the base case scenario, the biofuels sector was able to dominate
the bioenergy feedstock market, but the biopower sector
remained a non-player because its value for the feedstock was
30 $ t1 (27 $ ton1) below the market selling price.
We calculate the additional incentive needed for the biopower
industry by forcing it to pay whatever it takes to meet production
targets. No assumptions were made about the mechanism behind
this additional compliance incentive, and no other changes were
made to the base case assumptions. Using this simulation, the
difference between the actual cost and the desired cost of
production for biopower is the additional incentive that would
be needed to meet production targets. Essentially, the biopower
industry becomes demand driven instead of price driven in this
scenario.
Fig. 9 shows the incentive in addition to the REC value that
would be needed for biopower to meet 50% of RPS targets
nationwide, and the calculated RIN value in response to the added
competition. It is estimated that biopower requires an incentive
of 20 to 30 $ MW h1 in addition to the 15 $ MW h1 REC price tocompete in the advanced biomass feedstock market. If this
scenario occurs, it is likely to drive RIN values up to 0.08 $ l1
(0.30 $ gal1) over time, which remains under the 0.13 $ l1
(0.50 $ gal1) effective cap. Fig. 10 shows the trend in feedstock
values, the amount delivered and consumed, and the cumulative
demand curves for each industry. Biopower and biofuels both
meet their production targets in this scenario, but the market
price of the biomass feedstock increases over time from 108 $ t1
(98 $ ton1) at the outset to 125 $ t1 (113 $ ton1) by 2030.
5.3. High value for exports
The demand for bioenergy feedstocks in the European Union
(EU) has been rapidly increasing in recent years. In 2005, the EU
experienced a 16% growth in electricity produced from biomass.
In 2010, the demand in the EU for wood pellets increased by 7% to
over 11 Mton (Crowe, 2011). North America has doubled its
export volume to Europe over the past two years. This growth is
expected to continue, which is attracting US industries to expand
their production of wood pellets explicitly for export to
the EU. To simulate the effect of high value exports, the mean
feedstock value to port for export markets was increased from
66 $ t1 (60 $ ton1) to 154 $ t1 (140 $ ton1). Export quantity
demanded is assumed to start at 18 Mt yr1 (20 Mton yr1) in
2010 and rapidly increase over the next decade to 320 Mt yr1
(350 Mton yr1) by 2024. No other changes were made from the
base case for this scenario. Fig. 11 shows that the export sector
outbids biofuels for the feedstock during the later years of this
simulation. Exporters are able to acquire nearly all the biomass
they need to meet overseas demand, while domestic biofuel
production does not meet RFS production targets after 2015.
This is because the high demand drives feedstock prices up to 140
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Fig. 10. With incentives oscillating around 40 $ MW h1, biopower meets 50% of total RPS targets and the feedstock price increases over the span of the simulation.
R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263 259$ t1 (127 $ ton1), and RIN values hit the 0.13 $ l1 (0.50
$ gal1) cap by 2016. The biopower sector continues to have no
play in the market under these assumptions.
5.4. Price on GHG emissions
Our policy-driven techno-economic simulations conclude by
analyzing the effect of a US GHG emission-limiting policy on the
advanced biomass feedstock market. A GHG-limiting policy is
simulated that sets a price on GHG emissions per ton of CO2
equivalent. A recent EIA analysis of S.2191 (America’s Climate
Security Act of 2007) estimates the effective price of CO2 equiva-
lent emission at 40 to 60 $ t1 (36 to 54 $ ton1) to decrease
emissions to 15% below 2005 levels (Energy Information
Administration (EIA), 2009). Both biofuels and biopower are
assumed to be net zero GHG emitters in this case, and therefore
receive substantial beneﬁt from such a policy. It is expected that
the GHG incentive will provide greater value to the biopower
industry than the biofuels industry. With current industry prac-
tices, coal emits 2.1 t CO2 equivalent for every tonne burned,
and gasoline emits 0.0024 t CO2 equivalent for every litre burned
(US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2011). With this
information, the incentive to the biofuels sector is calculated
using Eq. 3:
IðPGHGÞFuels ¼
PGHG  EMG
GGEbf
, ð3Þ
where: PGHG is the effective price of GHG emission [$ t
1 (CO2)];
EMG the tonne GHG emission per litre gasoline [t (CO2) l
1 (gas)];
GGEbf the fraction gas equivalent of produced biofuel [l (biofuels)
l1 (gas)].Similarly, the incentive to the biopower sector is calculated
using Eq. 4:
IðPGHGÞPower ¼
PGHG  EMC
ZC
, ð4Þ
where: EMC is the tonne GHG emission per tonne coal [t (CO2) t
1
(coal)]; ZC the efﬁciency of coal conversion process [MW h t1
(coal)].
Eqs. 3 and 4 were inserted into the Bioenergy Market Model to
simulate the addition of a GHG policy to both the base case and
the high-value export market case. The lower EIA estimate of 40
$ t1 CO2 (36 $ ton
1) was used for the effective price of GHG
emissions. This price results in a 54 $ MW h1 incentive for the
biopower sector and a 0.07 $ l1 (0.26 $ gal1) incentive for the
biofuels sector.
Fig. 12 illustrates the effect of a GHG-limiting policy if expor-
ters do not substantially enter the biomass feedstock market. Both
biofuels and biopower meet the assumed production targets in
this scenario. In fact, biopower does so with a large margin of
feedstock value to spare, suggesting that the industry could
expand production beyond the assumed targets. The biofuels
industry’s RIN value begins at 0.026 $ l1 (0.10 $ gal1), grows
to 0.05 $ l1 (0.19 $ gal1) by 2018 due to competition with
biopower, and shrinks to 0.01 $ l1 (0.04 $ gal1) by 2022 once
RFS targets plateau. Similarly, the market price of advanced
biomass feedstocks begins the simulation at 130 $ t1 (118
$ ton1) and stabilizes at 125 $ t1 (113 $ ton1) by 2022.
If the 154 $ t1 (140 $ ton1) value to exporters is assumed
along with a domestic GHG-limiting policy, the results in Fig. 13
suggest that domestic consumption of bioenergy feedstocks con-
tinues to thrive. The biopower industry retains a signiﬁcant margin
0
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
M
to
nn
e/
yr
Feedstock Price, $/tonne
7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 91 98 105 112 119 126 133 140 147 154 161 168 175 182 189 196
Suppliers feedstock price and supply
1-tier Stacked Biopower cumulative demand
2-tier Stacked Export cumulative demand
Biofuel cumulative demand
Exports
Biopower
Biofuels
$80
1/1/2010 1/1/2014 1/1/2018
Time
pe
r t
on
ne
1/1/2022 1/1/2026 1/1/2030
$100
$120
$140
$160
Mean value of feedstock for biopower
Feedstock market price
Mean value of feedstock for biofuels
Mean value of feedstock for exports
M
to
nn
e/
yr
Time
0
1/1/2010 1/1/2014 1/1/2018 1/1/2022 1/1/2026 1/1/2030
100
200
300
400
500
600
Stacked Material to Export Stacked Material to Power Material to Fuel
Fig. 11. With high value and demand to exports, biofuels does not meet RFS targets because the RIN value reaches its cap and no longer provides adequate incentive.
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industry meets RFS targets in most years, but are constrained from
years 2015 to 2018 as the RIN value hits the 0.13 $ l1 (0.50
$ gal1) effective cap. RIN values settle just below 0.10 $ l1 (0.38
$ gal1) after this time. Exporters are able to acquire 120 t (132 ton)
of their 320 t (350 ton) demand in 2030 because their mean
feedstock value of 154 $ t1 (140 $ ton1) is below the ﬁnal market
price of 158 $ t1 (143 $ ton1) for advanced biomass feedstocks. In
all, 490 Mt yr1 (540 Mton yr1) is supplied by the feedstock
grower at the end of this simulation and the grower payment alone
is 118 $ t1 (107 $ ton1).6. Summary of results
The results of our simulations indicate widely varying beha-
vior for the price of advanced biomass feedstocks depending on
policy assumptions. With a 0.13 $ l1 (0.50 $ gal1) cap on the
value of an advanced biofuel RIN, the biofuels industry is able to
compete in all scenarios, but does not meet the RFS targets if
exporters increase demand signiﬁcantly. Biofuels maintains a
value advantage over biopower in the base simulation for three
reasons: liquid transportation fuels are currently valued signiﬁ-
cantly higher than coal-produced electricity per quantity of
energy produced, biofuel production is driven by national policy
while biopower production is driven by state policy, and there are
few signiﬁcant alternative transportation fuels for gasoline in the
US, but there are several alternatives for coal power. A policy that
targets major GHG emitters such as coal ﬁre power plants would
disproportionately beneﬁt the biopower industry, to the point
that they compete with and even surpass the buying power ofbiofuels for advanced biomass feedstocks. Exporters may have a
large advantage over both industries if no domestic GHG-limiting
policy is enacted.
Notably, the second scenario in which the biopower industry
receives incentives that cause it to compete with the biofuels
industry was also examined by Langholtz et al. (2012). Many of
their assumptions are similar to those in this article, and the
estimates of cumulative demand from both industries in 2022 are
similar: 327 Mt (360 Mton) in our analysis vs. 295 Mt (325 Mton)
in theirs. They report a grower payment of 72 $ t1 (65 $ ton1)
to supply this demand, which did not include harvesting and
collection costs. The grower payment simulated in our analysis
does include harvesting and collection, and is calculated at 78
$ t1 (71 $ ton1). We also estimated the market price of the
processed bioenergy feedstock as 123 $ t1 (112 $ ton1) in 2022
for this scenario. The additional contributing costs for the feed-
stock are due to logistics and dynamic supply limitations of the
market. This suggests that the grower payment dynamics in the
Bioenergy Market Model are reasonable, and that average prices
well in excess of 100 $ t1 (91 $ ton1) for advanced bioenergy
feedstocks are not unreasonable.
The primary variable cost that drives up the feedstock price
with increasing demand is the grower payment relationship
illustrated in Fig. 6. Because this curve is used in an x-given-y
fashion in the Bioenergy Market Model, relatively small slopes
indicate relatively high marginal cost of acquiring raw biomass.
For example, in 2017 the grower payment curve has a slope
of 2 Mt yr1 for every 1 $ t1 when raw demand exceeds
300 Mt yr1. As the simulation moves through time more biomass
is available at lower prices, and these slopes become steeper.
Fig. 14 provides a dynamic view of this effect. The contours show
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Fig. 12. With a GHG emission limiting incentive, the biopower industry experiences a large increase in its value for biomass.
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at different levels of demand. At the end of the simulation in 2030,
500 Mt yr1 (550 Mton yr1) of raw biomass requires an average
grower payment of 95 $ t1 (86 $ ton1) under the base assump-
tions of the DOE Billion Ton Update (US Department of Energy
(DOE), 2011a). However, to satisfy the domestic biopower and
biofuels industries and provide biomass to exporters, the volume
required in 2030 is 690 Mt yr1 (760 Mton yr1). These high
marginal costs are why the ﬁnal scenario in which all industries
are actively competing exhibits high prices for the bioenergy
feedstock, and export demand is not satisﬁed.7. Conclusions
This article introduces and demonstrates the use of a computer
simulation model to examine bioenergy markets from a strategic
policy viewpoint. It shows that multiple policies targeting clean,
domestically produced energy can create competition for bio-
mass, and that this competition can effectively drive up prices for
the biomass feedstocks and potentially exclude industries from
the market. We also show that assumptions about the demand
and value for foreign exports have a large effect on whether
domestic targets for bioenergy production are met. In general,
a GHG-limiting policy similar to the S.2191 Climate Security Act
could ensure that the advanced biomass feedstocks being pursued
by DOE will stay in the United States to be processed into
high-value products. Because the EU already has such policies in
place, their economic value for these feedstocks may prove to
be much higher and the scenario presented in Section 5.3 in
which bioenergy plays a minor domestic role would prove likely.A relaxed cap on RIN values would increase the value of domestic
biofuel, but may generate pushback from the biofuels industry.
The Bioenergy Market Model developed for this analysis
presents a new method for examining dynamic market pricing
for commodities where supply and demand are heavily inter-
dependent. Dynamic supply and demand limitation provide
insight into additional market pressures that may drive feedstock
prices up. This type of model proves useful for policy studies
because it highlights overall system behavior instead of concen-
trating on ﬁne technical detail. The level of aggregation allows the
identiﬁcation of tipping points, leverage switches, and behavior
modes that more detailed analyses often take years to accom-
plish. GHG-limiting policies and grower payment learning curves
have been identiﬁed as potential leverage switches in this
analysis.
Further work should be done to examine the variable costs
present in the logistics of advanced biomass processing to ﬁnd
additional potential leverage switches. Because the grower pay-
ment exhibits learning curve behavior, logistics costs may behave
similarly. The supplier may have a higher incentive to lower
production costs, thereby decreasing the minimum feedstock
price if a large body of incremental demand resides below the
current minimum price. Therefore, these learning curves could be
linked to demand using a feedback loop. As indicated by EIA 2007
report, GHG allowance prices are strongly sensitive to the avail-
ability and cost of low-carbon energy technologies. This indicates
potential for feedback between bioenergy development and GHG
allowance prices, which could be analyzed with the Bioenergy
Market Model. Additionally, sensitivity analysis using this model
should be accomplished to ﬁnd technology and policy improve-
ments that have the greatest effect on each industry, which would
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Fig. 13. With a GHG emissions limiting incentive and a powerful export market, domestic targets are still attained, but feedstock prices are relatively high.
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Fig. 14. The grower payment at multiple demand quantities exhibits ‘‘learning
curve’’ behavior.
R.F. Jeffers et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 249–263262drive research into cost-effective technology improvements.
Finally, the model’s structure should be used to investigate
commodity markets other than those within the bioenergy sector
in which technology and policy play a critical role in market
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